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Introduction 
There are many books that have dealt with agrarian issues in 
Mexico in general terms, five of which I have used for this paper. 
However, we lack knowledge of the practice of these critical issues, 
even to this day, and how they were enacted differed from state to 
state. 
The discovery of this source base in the U.S. State Department 
archives offers a first remarkable look at the state of Chiapas. I 
located fifty previously unseen records from Record Group 59 for this 
paper. Their critical analysis reveals a complex reality at the border of 
Mexico and Guatemala. 
One book by Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, A Poor People: 
Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas, promised insights into 
agrarian reforms, but it did not deal with the region where coffee was 
grown. 
During the 1880s and 1890s, Porfirio Díaz allowed numerous 
foreign companies to set up plantations and businesses in Mexico, 
namely German entrepreneurs who successfully cultivated the coffee 
beans and the plantations and marketed the coffee in Soconosco, 
selling it to North America and Europe.1 United States capital began 
 
1 Thomas Benjamin and William McNellie, Other Mexicos: Essays on 
Regional Mexican History 1876-1911 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1984), 133. 
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pouring into Chiapas between 1900 and 1910, and eventually the 
value of the capital began surpassing the value of the German capital 
in all of Chiapas.2 By the 1920s, American-owned land in Mexico 
was valued at around $140 million.3 One of the companies included in 
that value was the German-American Coffee Company, which owned 
four different tracts of land throughout Chiapas. 
In 1910, agrarian reforms were put into place to prevent foreign 
companies from taking the lands belonging to the local people. Once 
in office, President Lázaro Cárdenas launched his Six-Year Plan, 
which promised to distribute lands to everyone until the needs of all 
the rural populations had been met.4 He propelled forward land 
reform policies and accelerated studies of land petitions that had 
already begun. In fact, he quadrupled the amount of land that the 
government redistributed.5 This caused foreign companies, like the 
German-American Coffee Company, to lose land when the Mexican 
government decided to seize it. The United States and Mexico’s 
attempt to settle the agrarian matters facing the coffee company 
would seem like a matter of diplomacy. Instead, it became a showcase 
of how a company as unimportant as the coffee company could get 
caught in the implementation of a revolutionary new law that was 
foreign to them, and the professional hesitancy and disregard by the 
United States government, who was supposed to be representing 
them. 
 
 
 
2 Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, A Poor People: Politics and Society in 
Modern Chiapas (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 83. 
3 John J. Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2008), 23. 
4 Dana Markiewicz, The Mexican Revolution and the Limits of the Agrarian 
Reform, 1915-1946 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1993), 86. 
5 Ann L. Craig, The First Agraristas (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1989), 123. 
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Agrarian Reform Changes the Business Environment 
There are three types of land-grants that the Mexican government 
offered and that people sought: restitution, expansion, or dotation.6 
Restitution grants were rarely given out, because they required some 
type of proof of Spanish royal land grants given to Indian 
communities.7 The second type of grant was that of expansion. That 
grant was given to communities who already had an ejido8 in their 
community but did not have a sufficient amount of land for all of the 
eligible ejidatarios9 to work. The final type of grant was the dotation 
grant. A majority of the ejidos received this grant.10 The government 
gave it out to communities that were not eligible for the restitution 
grant, but then in later years, it was granted “to communities of 
landless agricultural laborers with no history of communal 
landownership.”11 
The German-American Coffee Company experienced the 
problems of the dotation grant. The main office was located in 
Omaha, Nebraska, in the United States,12 but the company itself was 
physically located in Triunfo, Salto de Agua, in Chiapas, Mexico, in 
the district of Palenque.13 In most correspondences, the property was 
referred to as simply “Triunfo” or “El Triunfo.” The plantation was 
 
6 Craig, The First Agraristas, 249. 
7 Ibid., 249-250. 
8 An ejido is an area of communal land holding that is used for agriculture, 
where each community member farms on a small parcel of land. 
9 These are people who do not actually own the land they cultivate. They are 
allowed to use it indefinitely, and they can even pass that allowance on to their 
children. 
10 Craig, The First Agraristas, 250. 
11 Ibid. 
12 NAUS, RG 59, M1370, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1930-1939, Reel #103, 
812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1 (hereafter cited as M1370/103, 
812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1). 
13 Ibid. 
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managed by a William (Guillermo, Wilhelm) Fahrholz14, who lived 
on the plantation and oversaw the various duties.15 The Mexican 
government had taken plantations that were similar in size to the 
German-American Coffee Company, but until then, it had left that 
company alone.16 Once the Mexican government seized the property, 
Fahrholz gained the help and support of the US Embassy.  
The German-American Coffee Company was incorporated in 
1903, before the dispute arose between the Mexican government and 
the company. This newly incorporated company was the second most 
important North American capital investment in Chiapas.17 Like most 
other plantations in Chiapas, it was owned solely by American 
investors. The only one who owned shares in the company who was 
not American was Fahrholz, who was a German national.18 Because 
of the name of the company, in the beginning, both governments 
doubted that it was an American company. When Jaime Torres Bodet, 
the future Secretary of Public Education in Mexico, inquired about its 
nationality, he was informed “… that the name probably had its origin 
in the fact that some of the organizers were persons of German origin 
. . . and that practically all of the owners . . . were American 
citizens.”19 It is clear that the United States government wanted to 
make sure that this was truly an American company before they got 
involved with it. Once the company’s vice-president produced 
evidence of the one hundred seventy bondholders, their residency, and 
the amount of money they had invested,20 the government agreed to 
help them out.  
 
14 Unfortunately, the only other information on William Fahrholz is a lawsuit 
from 1950. All other traces of him remain elusive. 
15 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Benjamin, A Rich Land, A Poor People, 83. 
18 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1. 
19 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/9. 
20 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1. 
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One person who had a vested interest in the case of the German-
American Coffee Company was Karl Stefan21, a Congressman from 
Nebraska, where the main office was located. Many of the people 
who invested in the company lived in the district that he represented, 
so it only stands to reason that he would be willing to help protect 
their investments, especially if he wanted to get reelected.22  
He also received the information about the stock and bondholders 
and he submitted the proposition as one that involved the property 
interests of citizens of the United States.23 Stefan insisted in his letters 
to various people that Fahrholz was doing his best to protect the 
interests of US citizens.24 As a result, Sumner Welles, the Deputy 
Secretary of State, told Stefan that he would instruct the American 
Embassy to help the company in any way possible on behalf of the 
American citizens who held stocks and bonds in the company.25 
However, the Embassy wrote that Fahrholz informed them that he 
would not seek the help of the American government except as a last 
resort.26 
 
The Government Offers Its Help 
Eventually, Fahrholz decided he needed help from higher 
authorities. He began calling the Embassy on a regular basis about his 
problems. They were prepared to help him, as Welles had asked them 
to be. He asked them numerous questions about ways to resolve his 
 
21 Karl Stefan moved to Omaha, Nebraska, with his parents in 1885, from what 
is now the Czech Republic. He moved to Norfolk, Nebraska, in 1909 to be a 
telegrapher. He was first elected to Congress in 1934, and remained in office until 
his death in 1951 (“Karl Stefan.” Wikipedia. 29 November 2013. 
www.wikipedia.org). 
22  M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1. 
23  M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4. 
24 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/5. 
25 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4. 
26 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1. 
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case. He continued to try to get an appointment with President 
Cárdenas, insisting that if he could just explain his predicament, the 
president would agree with him and put a stop to all expropriations on 
the El Triunfo land.27 On June 4, 1937, Fahrholz met with Pierre de L. 
Boal, an undersecretary to Josephus Daniels, to discuss with him 
some thoughts on how to solve everything.28 One of his ideas was in 
regards to the Bucareli Treaties and if there were any possible 
provisions in them that might be able to provide any type of 
assistance.29  
The treaties derive their name from the location in which they 
took place in 1923 between Mexico and the United States: Bucareli 
Street in Mexico City.30 Representatives from both countries drafted 
two claims agreements: the “Special Claims Convention” and a 
“General Claims Convention.”31 The treaties assured that American 
lands would remain intact and untouched in exchange for support of 
Obregón’s government, which quickly improved relations between 
the two countries.32 The two conventions were signed at different 
times: the General Claims Convention was signed in Washington, 
D.C., in September of 1923, and became effective in March of 1924.33 
The Special Claims Convention was signed in Mexico City, in 
September of 1923, and went into effect in February of 1924.34 The 
treaties were short-lived, however, because once Calles came into 
power, he began expropriating American-owned property, and refused 
to give it back, saying that they would not change their agrarian 
 
27 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/5. 
28 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6. 
29 Ibid. 
30 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/8. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 37-38. 
33 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/8. 
34 Ibid. 
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policy.35 Therefore, there were no provisions that could help Fahrholz 
in his time of need. 
Not to be deterred, Fahrholz continued with his questions. He 
wanted to know if it was it possible to have a presentation of a 
diplomatic claim on behalf of the company. Unfortunately, that was 
not possible, either, because claims for expropriations occurring after 
1934 “could not be dealt with by any existing claims commission.”36 
Boal did tell him that he could ask the Department of the Embassy if a 
diplomatic claim could be provided for now or at some point in the 
future, but that it might be extremely difficult to accomplish a lot for 
the company.37 Author Ann L. Craig writes that in practice, the 
government rarely reimbursed owners for expropriating the land, but 
when they did, it was mainly to foreign landowners and not to the 
natives.38 
The company hired a legal firm in Nebraska to help with their 
case, hoping it would speed things along. The main attorney from the 
firm, Charles E. Abbott, had had an interest in the company for over 
twenty years.39 Sources do not give a reason for his interest. Fahrholz 
wrote to Abbott, telling him that they needed to get their 
expropriation case through to the American Embassy quickly. 
Someone from the State Department had arrived at El Triunfo with 
the intention of turning the Triunfo land over to the Indians.40 
“This is just what I intended to avoid by seeing the President in 
time, whereof unfortunately I did not get a chance,” Fahrholz wrote in 
his letter to Abbott,41 in regards to his attempts to get a meeting with 
President Cárdenas. 
 
35 Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 38. 
36 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Craig, The First Agraristas, 129. 
39 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/17. 
40 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1. 
41 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/3. 
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In response, Abbott sent a letter to Stefan, requesting that the 
American State Department ask the Mexican government to stop all 
of the activities that were being used to take away the El Triunfo land 
until the property had been fully considered.42 Abbott pointed out to 
Stefan that the company was a working business, and that if it was 
hindered in any way, the losses would be considerably large,43 
especially since El Triunfo was the main coffee plant. 
The other lawyer they hired, Harvey A. Basham, formally 
represented the company and was a prominent American lawyer who 
had set up his practice in Mexico City and had good ties to the 
American Embassy.44 When Fahrholz consulted with Basham, the 
lawyer told him that he had had other similar cases as the coffee 
company’s taken up with the Embassy, but he’d had no positive 
results.45 
At one point, Fahrholz informed Boal that a “coyote”46 had 
approached him and said he knew all about the case of the German-
American Coffee Company. The coyote attempted to bribe Fahrholz, 
saying that he would take care of things for 15,000 pesos.47 Even 
though Fahrholz said he declined the offer, it is not surprising that an 
attempt at bribery was made. John Mason Hart (as cited in John J. 
Dwyer’s book The Agrarian Dispute) said, “Fraud and corruption 
were inherent in the process.”48 He was informed by Boal that the 
Embassy could not have any part in anything illegal, whether directly 
or indirectly. Fahrholz reassured him that he just wanted the offer to 
 
42 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1. 
43 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6. 
44 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/17. 
45 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4. 
46 A “coyote” is a term that generally refers to one who smuggles immigrants 
into the United States. 
47 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6.  
48 Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 23. 
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be on record as having been suggested.49 It is hard to know if 
Fahrholz made that arrangement with the coyote in the beginning, but 
then backed out at the last minute and reported it to the Embassy to 
cover his own tracks. 
Fahrholz continued to insist on seeing President Cárdenas. In a 
letter to Joel M. Roberts, the vice president of the German-American 
Coffee Company, Fahrholz wrote, “When staying in El Triunfo on his 
propaganda trip in 1934, he [Cárdenas] voluntarily offered me to call 
on him on any matter and at any time, as he would gladly attend 
me.”50 Taking possible deception into account in the entire process, it 
is not hard to believe that Cárdenas’s words to Fahrholz were nothing 
but empty promises. Fahrholz was convinced that the expropriation of 
land from the El Triunfo plantation was a made-up job by lesser 
authorities.51 In his letter to Roberts, he writes, “It seems just like 
being done intentionally to raise trouble where none are.”52 
In his quest to help Fahrholz obtain a meeting with Cárdenas, 
Stefan petitioned to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to see if the 
United States Ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, would be 
willing to make an exception in requesting an appointment between 
Cárdenas and Fahrholz, but the ambassador was not willing to make 
any exceptions.53 
Daniels felt sympathy for the peasantry of Mexico. He and 
President Roosevelt of the United States both felt that land 
redistribution was a great way to help the poor.54 This sympathy 
towards the people of Mexico really allowed the Mexican government 
to string the US government along, because Cárdenas kept telling 
Roosevelt what he wanted to hear: that the American people were 
 
49 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6. 
50 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/5. 
54 Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 165. 
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going to be paid for their land. Mexico never followed through with 
the promise, though. 
Finally, Stefan wrote to Hull, telling him that the situation with 
the company seemed to be getting worse. The people representing the 
company were beginning to feel that the officials at the Embassy were 
not doing anything to help them.55 In a way, the company was correct. 
The officials did not really want to get involved in the whole process. 
President Roosevelt had other things to worry about, such as the 
United States emerging out of the Great Depression, and the threat of 
World War II. The last thing Roosevelt and others in his 
administration probably wanted to deal with was something as small 
as agrarian matters. As it turned out, the US government stated that it 
was their understanding that the delay was because of Fahrholz’s 
attempts to see Cárdenas.56 Once they cleared that issue up, Boal 
immediately sent off a letter to General Eduardo Hay, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in Mexico. 
In his letter, he requested that the issues of the German-American 
Coffee Company be investigated, and if the company was in danger 
of losing everything, then a new resolution be written so that the 
company would be allowed to remain in operation and not lose all of 
its investments.57 
In an effort to remind Hay of the other reasons for his letter, he 
outlined a few of the facts as he understood them in regards to the 
coffee company. He stated that the ejidos of Tumbala, San Felipe58, 
and other areas that existed when the company purchased lands 
already had more than enough land than they needed or could 
completely cultivate.59 He also understood that a census had been 
 
55 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/7. 
56 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/8. 
57 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/9. 
58 San Felipe is a part of Tumbala. 
59 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/9. 
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taken after a new petition for lands had been made by the village of 
Tumbala. The census stated that there were 277 individuals, which 
included heads of households and families, and that all of these 
people were entitled to land.60 However, wrote Boal, “it is reliably 
reported that at the place there have never existed even one-fifth as 
many persons entitled to lands.”61 He felt that the census of Tumbala 
was inflated by bringing in people from the other surrounding areas.62 
Author Ann L. Craig has pointed out that there were ways to 
misrepresent the amount of people that needed land.63 Some ways to 
do this included forging signatures, listing non-residents of a 
community, and having laborers and craftsmen apply on the petition 
instead of just campesinos.64 In order to be considered for a land 
grant, a community had to have at least twenty signatures. Craig 
points out that the same number of individuals on the petition would 
also be judged to determine if they were eligible to receive land when 
the government took census of the area.65  
 
Reports Create Frustration and Suspicion 
In August of 1937, the Foreign Office of Mexico sent a report 
from the Agrarian Department in the Mexican government stating 
their findings on the issues with the German-American Coffee 
Company. When Boal forwarded the report to Hull, he mentioned that 
Fahrholz was shown the report and he said that it was an inadequate 
refutation of the company’s case, and that he planned to prepare 
counter-arguments.66 
 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Craig, The First Agraristas, 96. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/11. 
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The Foreign Office of Mexico stated in their findings that the 
agrarian census that showed the 277 individuals included areas around 
Tumbala, because they were politically and economically dependent 
upon the area requesting dotation of the lands expropriated.67 In 
response to the claim that the ejidos had more than enough land, the 
report points out that it was necessary to grant those people land, 
because they, in fact, did not have sufficient land. Each area around 
Tumbala had a share in 1,454 hectares of pastureland with fifty 
percent workable communal land. The tillable land was enough for 
ninety parcels, so that each person was granted eight hectares.68 Thus, 
it was deemed that the area did not have enough land for those who 
lived there. 
Of course, Fahrholz did not agree with the findings of the 
Mexican Agrarian Department, and insisted to Karl Stefan that it did 
not state the facts correctly or truthfully, nor did it offer any type of 
settlement or remedy for the situation.69 Stefan suggested to Hull that 
maybe the company could submit a claim to the General Claims 
Commission for the US and Mexico. Unfortunately, by that time, it 
was too late to submit any claim. Under the existing treaty between 
the two countries, the jurisdiction of the General Claims Commission 
only extended to claims that had arisen between July 4, 1868, and 
August 30, 1927.70 There was not even a way to lengthen or broaden 
the jurisdiction of the Commission, since there was a provision in the 
General Claims Convention that did not allow the Commission any 
jurisdiction to claims after 1927.71 
In addition to that, the German-American Coffee Company was 
denied any opportunity to amparo proceedings. Amparo means 
 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/12. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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“protection” in Spanish, and refers to the protection of human rights, 
or a constitutional protection lawsuit.72 Article 10 of the Agrarian 
Law of January 6, 1915, reads, “Land owners affected by resolutions 
heretofore or hereafter issued for the purpose of endowing towns 
with, or restoring to them, “ejidos” or waters shall not have the right 
or ordinary legal remedy or the special remedy of amparo.”73 
Transitory Article 2 of Article 10 also states that “all amparo suits 
pending decision either before district courts or on appeal . . . shall be 
forthwith dismissed.”74 
As a result, Harvey A. Basham, lawyer to the company in Mexico 
City, advised the company that even if they had begun amparo 
proceedings, they would have been for naught, since the Agrarian 
Law clearly stated that the suit would have been dismissed by the 
government.75 He also told them that in his opinion, as long as 
Cárdenas was to remain president, there would be no modification of 
any importance that would be beneficial to the plantation owners.76 
In a sit-down conference between Basham, Fahrholz, Abbot, and 
two other men, of whom sources do not speak except for this source, 
Basham said that El Triunfo would have to cease operations because 
of the way the properties were divided up.77 According to Mexican 
officials, the Mexican government also had no intention of paying any 
just compensation to Americans whose property they had confiscated. 
Basham felt that their attitude toward the entire ordeal was pretty 
cavalier, that since the Mexican government saw America as a great 
 
72 Norma Gutierrez, “Mexico: New Amparo Law is Enacted,” Global Legal 
Monitor, Apr. 30, 2013, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_ 
l205403575_text. 
73 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/16. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/17. 
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and wealthy nation, they would not press for any type of 
compensation.78 
Despite that, Basham submitted a proposal to the others in the 
conference. The proposal included payment, in cash, to American 
citizens with money invested in the company on the taxable value of 
the land that had been expropriated, plus ten percent.79 He was of the 
opinion that the Mexican government would consider the proposal if 
they submitted it properly and, should it actually have a fair chance at 
being accepted, it could be a formal agreement between the United 
States and Mexico.80 
At first, the proposal was doubted by many, but in Josephus 
Daniels’ view, the plan had some merit, especially since Harvey 
Basham had come up with it. Basham had considerable prominence in 
the Mexican community, was familiar with Mexico and its dealings, 
and had a lot of experience in Mexico. In view of those qualities, 
Daniels thought it was something to be considered by the Embassy.81 
Had anyone else suggested the idea, he would have been dismissed 
and the idea thought of as absurd. 
The idea was raised with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also 
to President Cárdenas himself, but when questioned by the American 
Embassy as to the progress of the idea, Daniels was always told that 
the Mexican government was studying ways of how to pay for the 
lands.82 This was one way in which the Mexican government 
managed to string the US along. Cárdenas and his cabinet members 
would drag an issue out as long as they possibly could, by evading 
questions and giving vague answers. Finally the Embassy was told 
that the best person to answer the question was the Minister of the 
 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/18. 
82 Ibid. 
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Hacienda, Eduardo Suarez. It was said that he knew more about his 
country’s financial position and whether or not Mexico could afford 
to make payments to the citizens whose lands had been taken away.83 
The Agrarian Code of Mexico stated that the landowner whose 
land was expropriated could apply for compensation, provided that he 
did it within one year of the publication of the presidential resolution 
in the Diario Oficial.84 The presidential resolution is a decree signed 
by Cárdenas to give the land to the ejidos. Once it is published in the 
Diario Oficial85, the rest of the land distribution can be carried out. 
Fahrholz applied for that compensation within the time frame; 
however, when he filled out the paperwork sent to him by the 
American Consul, he wrote down the wrong date of the publication of 
the presidential resolution. The consul brought it to his attention, 
suggesting that he get his facts right before filling out the new 
paperwork they were sending him.86 Since he wrote down the wrong 
dates, it is difficult to be clear if he actually got his application in on 
time. It would seem that he did, because none of the evidence 
indicates otherwise. Fahrholz also happened to write down the wrong 
number of hectares contained in his properties of Machuyil and 
Revancha, prompting the consul to inform him that his numbers did 
not match up with the numbers of the Agrarian Department.87 It 
appears that later in 1938, Fahrholz’s numbers again do not match up, 
this time with the amount of hectares taken by the Tax Collector in 
Salto de Agua. The Consul states that it is possible that they made a 
mistake, but after seeing all of the mistakes that Fahrholz had made 
thus far, it is unlikely.88 
 
83 Ibid. 
84 Craig, The First Agraristas, 252. 
85 The Diario Oficial is the official main publication of the Mexican 
government that is published daily. 
86 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/20. 
87 Ibid. 
88 M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/26. 
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The Agrarian Department sent their report to the American 
consul to refute Fahrholz’s arguments. The report addresses all four of 
Fahrholz’s main arguments, including the one regarding census 
inflation. It states that a census was first taken in 1926 and the Local 
Agrarian Commission announced the results in public, so that any 
parties interested could present objections within thirty days, and the 
German-American Coffee Company made no such objections.89 
Despite no arguments or objections, the Agrarian Department took 
another census in 1936, along with a representative of the company, 
Juan Tello, and he agreed with the department that, indeed, there 
existed 284 people who were eligible to receive lands, even though 
the department only gave land to 272 of those people. Tello even 
signed the census saying that he agreed with the numbers.90 
The department also pointed out that in October of 1936, the 
German-American Coffee Company told the Agrarian Delegation that 
they had never, and would never, interfere with the carrying out of 
any agrarian laws. All the company was asking, according to the 
report, was for a change in the ejidal lands.91 The company told the 
delegation that it owned better land on its other properties and that the 
land on the El Triunfo plantation was not as good as the other 
properties. They said that El Triunfo was rocky and uneven.92 Their 
argument was that the delegation should take land from the other 
properties and give it to the people, since it was much better, and let 
the company keep El Triunfo, because that land was not as good.93  
It is interesting to note, as does the Mexican Agrarian 
Department in their report, that if the Triunfo land was as bad as the 
company claimed, it would be beneficial to the company to get rid of 
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it.94 However, it makes one wonder whether the Triunfo land was as 
bad as they said. The plantation owners said it was uneven and rocky. 
Yet, if that were the case, why did they make Triunfo their main 
coffee plant? If the other properties had better land, why did they not 
make one of those properties the main plant? It seems as if the 
German-American Coffee Company did not want to give up Triunfo. 
In a letter to the company’s vice-president, Fahrholz wrote, “If the 
Government wants to harm us any way, I mean take some more land 
from us, let them take from our Chuctiepa land, but not from 
Triunfo!”95 It stands to reason that they would want to keep Triunfo, 
since it covered about 43,000 acres and employed about 3,000 
Indians.96 Looking at all of the evidence, it appears that the company 
was employing some type of deception to keep what they deemed to 
be the best land.  
As if to remind Fahrholz of the amount of land the Mexican 
government took from them, the American consul sent several letters 
to Fahrholz, urging him to keep the consulate informed of any other 
properties that might be mentioned in presidential resolutions that 
might possibly have American investors.97 He was also reminded 
several times by the office of the Secretary of State to carefully 
observe all of Mexico’s laws and to document and keep all evidence 
available in case they could possibly file any future claims.98 
In response to the Secretary of State, Abbott told him that since 
his clients did not have any rights under Mexico’s agrarian laws, what 
were they to do? He also mentioned that the German-American 
Coffee Company had been a working plantation, and since the seizure 
of its lands, its value had pretty much diminished due to lack of care 
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and neglect.99 Eventually, conditions became so bad for the company 
that it was extremely difficult for them to meet basic expenses and 
other obligations.100 
 
The Final Ultimatum  
The American government finally told Mexico that the American 
citizens whose land had been taken away from them, needed to be 
paid compensation.101 Mexico replied that they would make the 
arrangements, but that they needed to discuss the manner of 
payment.102 In Boal’s opinion (as cited in John J. Dwyer’s book, The 
Agrarian Dispute), “The possibilities of immediate cash 
compensation are so remote as to be negligible.”103 It is clear that this 
was simply another attempt by the Mexican government to stall in the 
negotiations for any type of payment to American citizens. 
Shortly thereafter, Fahrholz received a letter from the American 
consul regarding all of the German-American Coffee Company’s 
properties that had been affected by the Agrarian Laws. The consul 
pointed out that Fahrholz’s numbers, once again, conflicted with a 
presidential resolution regarding El Triunfo.104 The consul requested a 
copy of the source where Fahrholz had gotten his numbers, which he 
sent to them. He told the consul that it would probably be best to not 
bring the Mexican government’s attention to their mistakes in areas, 
and “avoid therefore more difficulties.”105 One has to wonder if the 
copy that Fahrholz had was, indeed, the original resolution, especially 
after all of his previous mistakes. 
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Finally, in November of 1938, Fahrholz received a letter stating 
that the two governments had come to an agreement regarding 
appraisals of affectations of land and an annual payment that was of a 
satisfactory amount to liquidate them over a number of years.106 The 
letter encouraged him to begin filling out paperwork for his claim as 
soon as possible, so that the company could submit the claim to the 
Commission right away.107 The agreement would enable agrarian 
claims that had arisen since August 30, 1927, to get a settlement.108 A 
second letter he received gave the deadline for submitting all claims 
as March 1, 1939.109 The day that Fahrholz received that letter gave 
him two months to get all of his evidence and mailings together to 
send to the American Consulate. 
At some point between January and May of 1939, the two 
governments extended the submission deadline to May 31, 1939, and 
then the Secretary of State announced in the end of April that they had 
agreed to extend the deadline until July 31, 1939.110 It was stated that 
the Mexican government agreed to pay one million dollars as a first 
payment and that they would have to make the payment to the United 
States on or before May 31, 1939, and the US government would 
distribute the payments to those whom the money belonged to.111 
It seemed that the German-American Coffee Company had some 
difficulties getting their paperwork in order, because Abbott asked 
Green H. Hackworth, a legal advisor in the office of the Secretary of 
State, on July 6, 1939, wanting to know if there was any possibility 
that the deadline might get extended out further.112 Unfortunately for 
them, Hackworth told them that there was no extended time, nor 
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would there be any extended time anywhere in the future.113 Finally, 
on July 22, the company sent off their paperwork, where it was filed 
on July 28, 1939.114 One would think that the company would have 
had their paperwork in sooner, since they had gone to all the trouble 
to gather up evidence since 1937. However, they reported having 
some difficulties preparing their papers due to the bad conditions on 
the plantation, so this may explain the situation.115 
 
Conclusion: Property Expropriation Comparison in Latin 
American Countries 
After several years of diplomatic foot-dragging, the US and 
Mexico finally reached a settlement, called the 1941 Convention 
between the United States and Mexico. It provided indemnification to 
those landowners whose land had been expropriated. The Mexican 
government ended up paying out $40 million for both agrarian and 
general claims.116 Whether the German-American Coffee Company 
saw any of that money is not known, for there are no other sources 
indicating any compensation or solutions for the agrarian problems. 
They are just one example of many during the years when Cárdenas 
began carrying out his agrarian reforms. Not only did large American 
companies have their land taken away, but so did the average 
American citizen who had gone to Mexico to farm.  
As it would seem, expropriation of property is not unique to 
Mexico. US property owners in Cuba and Chile experienced 
expropriation, as well. In Mexico, the value of all the property taken 
was $300 million. In Cuba and Chile, it was $1.8 billion and between 
$747 and $833 million, respectively.117 Even though international law 
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stated that any properties expropriated needed to be given prompt 
payment, both Chile and Cuba ignored it. Similarly to Mexico’s 
amparo proceedings, the governments refused to allow the owners of 
expropriated property to go through the courts in an attempt to collect 
payment.118 In Chile, if an expropriation case did manage to make it 
through court and the court happened to rule in favor of the case, the 
Chilean government acted as if the decision had never been made.119 
In all three cases, the State Department responded in some way 
economically when negotiations fell through. With Mexico, they put 
an import quota on Mexican oil, which nearly brought their oil 
exports to a halt.120 The State Department also kept large public and 
private loans from reaching Mexico.121 
In Cuba, the government simply declared a general trade 
embargo against them and also got rid of the island’s sugar import 
quota.122 In Chile’s case, the government was not quite so harsh. They 
just stopped giving Chile economic assistance and began 
“withholding support from loans under consideration by multinational 
financial institutions.”123 In each instance, the economic situations 
helped the US get what they wanted, even though it took years to 
reach a conclusion.  
Author George M. Ingram writes, “There would seem to be a 
flaw in a process where the U.S. Government is seldom involved in 
the initiation of a foreign business activity but is always called upon 
when trouble arises. [It] should develop a more precise policy toward 
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U.S. foreign investment.”124 The coffee company did nothing wrong 
to have their land taken away, but had the US had a more definitive 
policy regarding agrarian matters, the situation might not have 
dragged on as long as it did.  If there had been a preset policy, then all 
parties would have moved down the same path in unison and they 
would all be in compliance as they completed the negotiations. 
Now that we have seen that Mexico is not the only Latin 
American country the United States has dealt with in regards to land 
expropriation, it would make an interesting study to look at how the 
State Department took action in other Latin American countries that 
took up expropriating American-owned land, such as Bolivia and 
Uruguay. Both of those countries also targeted American-owned land 
in their agrarian reforms. To look at how the government dealt with 
those reforms in Bolivia and Uruguay might give us some insight on 
how the government views foreign policy in regards to foreign 
investments, especially when it comes to their own investments. 
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